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Abstract. In the past few years, several new matching models have
been proposed and studied that take into account complex distributional
constraints. Relevant lines of work include (1) school choice with diver-
sity constraints where students have (possibly overlapping) types and
(2) hospital-doctor matching where various regional quotas are imposed.
In this paper, we present a polynomial-time reduction to transform an
instance of (1) to an instance of (2) and we show how the feasibility
and stability of corresponding matchings are preserved under the reduc-
tion. Our reduction provides a formal connection between two important
strands of work on matching with distributional constraints. We then ap-
ply the reduction in two ways. Firstly, we show that it is NP-complete to
check whether a feasible and stable outcome for (1) exists. Due to our re-
duction, these NP-completeness results carry over to setting (2). In view
of this, we help unify some of the results that have been presented in
the literature. Secondly, if we have positive results for (2), then we have
corresponding results for (1). One key conclusion of our results is that
further developments on axiomatic and algorithmic aspects of hospital-
doctor matching with regional quotas will result in corresponding results
for school choice with diversity constraints.
1 Introduction
Real-life matching markets are often associated with various distributional con-
straints. In view of these constraints, there is a growing literature on matching
markets that models and deals with such constraints. There are at least two
distinct research directions in this growing literature.
The first one is school choice with diversity constraints, studied intensely in
the controlled school choice problem, in which students have types such as race,
gender, or socio-economic status. Each school is endowed with a lower and an
upper quota for each distinct type. Such type-specific quotas are taken into ac-
count while determining the outcome. For example, a school may impose a target
lower quota for accepting students from some disadvantaged group. The seeds
for considering models where students may be of different types were already
sown in the seminal paper on school choice [Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003].
Since the publication of the paper, there have been significant developments
on work concerning fairness requirement and algorithm design [Abdulkadirog˘lu,
2005, Kojima, 2012, Hafalir et al., 2013, Ehlers et al., 2014]. The most general
model in the line of work is school choice with overlapping types where students
can belong to multiple types [Kurata et al., 2017]. To overcome the non-existence
of feasible and stable outcomes, type-specific quotas of schools may be viewed
as soft requirements [Ehlers et al., 2014, Kurata et al., 2017].
Another research direction arises in the context of hospitals and doctors
matching with a restriction on the number of doctors that are allowed to be
matched to certain subsets of hospitals. This form of distributional constraints
can be modeled as hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas, in which doc-
tors are matched to hospitals, hospitals are associated with regions, and both
hospitals and regions are subject to quotas. For example, an upper quota may
be imposed on urban regions with several hospitals to ensure that enough doc-
tors are hired in rural regions [Kamada and Kojima, 2015, 2017a]. Individual
minimum quotas are studied in school admissions, motivated by the fact that
each school may require a minimum number of students to operate [Biro´ et al.,
2010, Fragiadakis et al., 2016]. Under general regional quotas, the set of stable
outcomes may be empty [Kamada and Kojima, 2017a,b] and it is NP-complete
to check whether there exists a feasible outcome [Goto et al., 2014, 2016]. Due to
these negative results, most work concentrate on special cases with restrictions
on the structure of regions for which they proposed algorithms [Kamada and
Kojima, 2012, 2015, Goto et al., 2014, 2015, 2016].
Although both lines of work have progressed in the past few years, their
development has been generally distinct from each other. Since each of the lines
of work stems from different real-life requirements, there has not been much work
on identifying formal connections between different new models. In particular,
several influential papers mention that one setting is different from the other.
For example, Hafalir et al. [2013] note in their seminal paper on school choice
with diversity constraints that
“Kamada and Kojima (2011) study the Japanese Residency Matching
Program, where there are quotas (regional caps) on the number of resi-
dents that each region can admit. [...] Although the idea of their paper is
similar to ours, the setups are completely different (for instance, there
are no doctor types in their model) as are the suggested solutions.”
And Goto et al. [2016] remark in their paper on matching with regional minimum
and maximum quotas that
“However, models and theoretical properties in a controlled school choice
program setting are quite different from the setting used in our paper.”
The remarks were made because the two models address different concerns
and intuitively appear different as well. In this paper, however, we demonstrate
that although the two setups discussed above seem different, there are strong
mathematical connections between them. Identifying formal connections between
matching models have several advantages (1) they help unify the literature, and
(2) they provide an efficient route to translate results from one model to another.
In fact, one of the major success stories of matching markets has been the identi-
fication of general structure over the preferences of hospitals that guarantees the
existence of stable matchings [Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005, Hatfield and Kojima,
2008].
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Fig. 1. Implications of the reduction from school choice with diversity constraints to
hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas
Contributions In this paper, we present a polynomial-time reduction to trans-
form an instance of (1) school choice with diversity constraints into an instance
of (2) hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas. We show how the feasibil-
ity and stability of corresponding matchings are preserved under the reduction.
Then we apply the reduction in two ways as described in Figure 1. First, we
study the complexity issues on computing a feasible and stable outcome. We
prove that it is NP-complete to check the existence of feasible and stable out-
comes for (1). Our reduction implies that these complexity results hold for (2) as
well. In view of this, we help unify some of the results that have been presented
in the literature. Second, if we have positive results, such as polynomial-time
algorithms that guarantee the existence of some weakly stable outcomes for the
model with regional quotas, then we have corresponding results for school choice
with diversity constraints. One key conclusion of our results is that further de-
velopments on axiomatic and algorithmic aspects of hospital-doctor matching
with regional quotas will result in corresponding results in school choice with
diversity constraints. In addition, we consider how to convert regional minimum
quotas into regional maximum quotas and we show the difference between re-
gional minimum quotas and regional maximum quotas.
2 Model
School choice
An instance IS of the basic school choice problem consists of a tuple (S,C, qC ,X ,≻S
,≻C).
There is a set of students S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} and a set of schools C =
{c1, c2, ..., cm}. Each school c ∈ C has a capacity qc and let qC = (qc)c∈C be a
capacity vector consisting of all schools’ capacities.
Each contract x = (s, c) is a student-school pair indicating that student s is
matched with school c. Let X ⊆ S×C denote the set of available contracts. For
any X ⊆ X , denote Xs = {(s, c) ∈ X |c ∈ C} as the set of contracts involving
student s and Xc = {(s, c) ∈ X |s ∈ S} as the set of contracts involving school c
in X .
Each student s has a strict preference ordering ≻s over Xs ∪ {(s, ∅)} where
(s, ∅) denotes the option of being unmatched for student s. A contract (s, c)
is acceptable to student s if (s, c) ≻s (s, ∅) holds. The preference profile of all
students is denoted by ≻S= {≻s1 , ...,≻sn}. Each school c has a strict priority
ordering ≻c over Xc∪{(∅, c)}, where (∅, c) represents the option of leaving a seat
vacant for school c. A contract (s, c) is acceptable to school c if (s, c) ≻c (∅, c)
holds. Let ≻C= {≻c1, ...,≻cm} denote the priority profile of all schools. Given
any two preference (or priority) orderings ≻p and ≻q, we say preference (or
priority) ordering ≻p is consistent with preference (or priority) ordering ≻q if
for any two contracts x, y, when x ≻p y holds, it implies x ≻q y.
An outcome (or a matching) X is a subset of X . Denote Sc(X) = {s ∈
S|(s, c) ∈ X} as the set of students matched to school c and Cs(X) = {c ∈
C|(s, c) ∈ X} as the set of schools matched to student s in the outcome X .
An outcome X is feasible for IS if i) for each student s, |Xs| ≤ 1, ii) for each
school c, |Xc| ≤ qc. A feasible outcome X is individually rational if each contract
(s, c) ∈ X is acceptable to both student s and school c.
A mechanism φ is a function that takes an instance as input and returns
a matching as an outcome. A mechanism φ is strategy-proof for students if
any student s ∈ S cannot be admitted to a better school by misreporting his
preference.
School choice with diversity constraints
An instance ID of school choice with diversity constraints is an extension of
school choice problem, denoted by a tuple (S,C,qC ,T ,τ ,η,η, X ,≻S ,≻C).
Let T = {t1, t2, ..., tk} be the type space with |T | ≤ |S|. A type vector
τs = (τ
t
s)t∈T of student s consists of 1’s and 0’s such that τ
t
s = 1 if student s
belongs to type t and τ ts = 0 otherwise. Let τ be the type matrix of all students’
type vectors. Let ηc = (η
t
c)t∈T be a vector of school c’s type-specific maximum
quotas where ηtc is school c’s maximum quota for type t. Similarly, ηc = (η
t
c
)t∈T is
a vector of school c’s type-specific minimum quotas. Let η and η be two matrices
consisting of all schools’ type-specific maximum vectors and minimum vectors
respectively.
For any two vectors consisting of non-negative integers ω = (ω1, ..., ωk) and
ω′ = (ω′1, ..., ω
′
k), we compare them in the following way: i) ω ≤ ω
′ if for each
i ∈ [1, k], ωi ≤ ω′i and ii) ω < ω
′ if for each i ∈ [1, k], ωi < ω′i. An outcome X ⊆ X
is feasible for ID with diversity constraints if it is feasible for IS and it respects
diversity constraints, i.e., for each school c ∈ C, we have ηc ≤
∑
s∈Sc(X)
τs ≤ ηc.
The following definition is a natural extension of classical stability concept
by Roth [1985] to the setting of diversity constraints.
Definition 1 (Stability).
Given a feasible outcome X for instance ID with diversity constraints, a
student s ∈ S and a school c ∈ C with (s, c) /∈ X will form a blocking pair if
(s, c) ≻s Xs and there exists a set of students S
′ ⊆ Sc(X) such that i) for each
student s′ ∈ S′, we have (s, c) ≻c (s′, c) and ii) the new outcome X ∪ {(s, c)} \
(
⋃
s′∈S′(s
′, c)∪{Xs}) is feasible for instance ID. A feasible outcome X is stable
if it is individually rational and it admits no blocking pair.
Definition 1 states that given a feasible outcome X , student s and school c will
form a blocking pair if student s prefers school c to his current assignment Xs
(which could be empty if Xs = (s, ∅)), and there exists a set of students S′
(which could be empty) that are matched to school c in the outcome X such
that i) each student s′ ∈ S′ has lower priority than student s and ii) school c
could admit student s by (possibly) removing the set of students S′.
We can decompose the blocking pair in Definition 1 into two cases: when
the set of students S′ is non-empty, we say student s has justified envy towards
students S′ and a feasible outcome X is fair if X admits no justified envy. If the
set of students S′ is empty, then we say the outcome X is wasteful. Alternatively,
a feasible outcome X is stable if it is individually rational, fair and non-wasteful.
Hospital-doctor matching
An instance IH of hospital-doctor matching is isomorphic to an instance I S of
basic school choice problem, denoted by a tuple (D,H, qH ,Y,≻D,≻H).
Let D = {d1, ..., dn} denote a set of doctors and H = {h1, ..., hm} denote a
set of hospitals. Let qH = (qh)h∈H be the vector consisting of each hospital’s
capacity where qh is the capacity of hospital h.
A contract y = (d, h) is a doctor-hospital pair such that d is matched with
h. Let Y ⊆ D × H denote a finite set of available contracts. For any Y ⊆ Y,
let Yd = {(d, h) ∈ Y |h ∈ H} be the set of contracts involving doctor d and
Yh = {(d, h) ∈ Y |d ∈ D} be the set of contracts involving hospital h.
Each doctor d has a strict preference ordering ≻d over Yd ∪ {(d, ∅)} and a
contract (d, h) is acceptable to doctor d if (d, h) ≻d (d, ∅). Each hospital h has a
strict priority ordering over Yh ∪ {(∅, h)} and a contract (d, h) is acceptable to
hospital h if (d, h) ≻h (∅, h). Let ≻D and ≻H denote the preference and priority
profiles of D and H respectively.
An outcome (or a matching) Y is a subset of Y. Denote Dh(Y ) = {d ∈
D|(d, h) ∈ Y } as the set of doctors matched to hospital h and Hd(Y ) = {h ∈
H |(d, h) ∈ Y } as the set of hospitals matched to doctor d in the outcome Y . An
outcome Y ⊆ Y is feasible for IH if i) for each doctor d, we have |Yd| ≤ 1, ii) for
each hospital h, |Yh| ≤ qh, and iii) for any doctor d and any hospital h, we have
d ∈ Dh(Y ) if and only if Hd(Y ) = {h}.
Hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas
An instance IR of hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas is a tuple
(D,H,R, qH , δ, δ,Y,≻D,≻H ,≻R) with additional entries R, δ, δ and ≻R.
Let R = {r1, ..., rj} denote a set of regions where each region ri ∈ R is a
subset of H , i.e., ri ⊆ H . A collection of regions P ⊆ R forms a partition of a
subset of hospitals H ′ ⊆ H , if
⋃
r∈P r = H
′ and for any two different regions
r, r′ ∈ P , we have r ∩ r′ = ∅. A collection of regions F ⊆ R forms a hierarchy of
hospitals H ′ ⊆ H , if
⋃
r∈F r = H
′ and for any two regions r, r′(6= r) ∈ F , one of
the three conditions holds: i) r ∩ r′ = ∅, ii) r ⊆ r′, or iii) r′ ⊆ r.
Let δ = (δr)r∈R denote a vector consisting of each region’s maximum quota
where δr is region r’s maximum quota. Similarly δ = (δr)r∈R is a vector of each
region’s minimum quota.
For any Y ⊆ Y, let Yr =
⋃
h∈r Yh be the set of contracts involving region
r and let Dr(Y ) = {d ∈ D|(d, h) ∈ Yr} denote the set of doctors matched to
region r in the outcome Y .
The introduction of regional priorities was intended to resolve the conflicts
when a region confronts more applicants of doctors than it could accommodate
[Kamada and Kojima, 2017a, 2018].4 We followed this idea and assume that
each region r has a strict priority ordering over Yr and a contract (d, h) ∈ Yr
is acceptable to region r if (d, h) ≻h (∅, h) holds.5 Let ≻R denote the priority
profile of all regions.
An outcome Y ⊆ Y is feasible for IR with regional quotas if Y is feasible for
IH and it respects regional quotas, i.e., for any region r we have δr ≤ |Dr(Y )| ≤
δr.
The following stability concept captures the idea that a blocking pair is not
considered as legitimate if it does not take regional priorities into account.
Definition 2 (Stability with regional priorities). Given a feasible outcome
Y ⊆ Y for instance IR with regional quotas, a doctor d ∈ D and a hospital
h ∈ H with (d, h) /∈ Y form a blocking pair with regional priorities if (d, h)
≻d (d, Yd) and there exists a set of doctors D′ ⊆ Dh(Y ) such that i) for each
doctor d′ ∈ D′, we have (d, h) ≻h (d′, h), ii) for each doctor d′ ∈ D′ and for
each region r with h ∈ r, we have (d, h) ≻r (d′, h), and iii) the new outcome
Y ∪ {(d, h)} \ (
⋃
d′∈D′{(d
′, h)} ∪ Yd}) is feasible for instance I
R. A feasible
outcome Y is stable with regional priorities if it is individually rational and it
admits no blocking pair with regional priorities.
Definition 2 states that given a feasible outcome Y , doctor d and hospital h will
form a blocking pair if doctor d prefers hospital h to his assigned hospital Hd(Y )
(which could be empty), and there exists a set of doctors D′ (which could be
empty) that are matched to hospital h in the outcome X such that i) each doctor
d′ ∈ D′ has lower priority than doctor d, ii) for each region r that is associated
with hospital h, each doctor d′ ∈ D′ has lower regional priority than doctor d
4 In [Kamada and Kojima, 2017a, 2018], regional preferences are defined in a weaker
way that regions only concern about how many doctors are matched rather than
which doctors are matched.
5 Similar ideas to regional preferences have already been considered. Kamada and
Kojima [2015] studied the model where all regions form a partition of hospitals H
and they assume that each region specifies a precedence ordering over hospitals.
and iii) hospital h could admit doctor d by (possibly) removing the set of doctors
D′.
The difference between Definition 1 and Definition 2 is that a blocking pair
for an instance of matching with regional quotas should respect the priorities
of both hospitals and regions. When distribution constraints do not exist, both
definitions collapse to the original stability concept [Roth, 1985].
We can decompose the blocking pair in the Definition 2 into two cases: when
the set of doctors D′ is non-empty, we say doctor d has justified envy towards D′
with regional priorities and an outcome is fair with regional priorities if it admits
no justified envy. When the set of doctors D′ is empty, we say the outcome is
wasteful.
3 Transformation from Diversity Constraints to Regional
Quotas
In this section, we explore the relation between (1) school choice with diversity
constraints and (2) hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas in terms of fea-
sibility and stability. We show how to convert an instance of (1) into an instance
of (2) in polynomial time and how the feasibility and stability of corresponding
matchings are preserved under the reduction.
In a recent work, Kamada and Kojima [2017b] illustrate how to associate
one instance of (1) with another of (2) when each student belongs to exactly one
type. The idea is straightforward: Each student corresponds to a doctor and each
school corresponds to a region. For each region, create multiple hospitals such
that each hospital is associated with one type and each doctor only considers
the hospital of the same type acceptable. However, we cannot directly extend
this idea to the general case allowing for overlapping types. The main issue is
that a doctor should not be assigned to several hospitals corresponding to the
types to which he belongs.
The crux of the transformation is how to eliminate overlapping types among
students. We can just create a new type space T = {t′1, ..., t
′
2|T |
} such that each
unique type vector τs corresponds to a new type t
′
τs
. It is not necessary to
consider the whole type space T when 2|T | is larger than |S|, because only the
distinct type vectors that appear in type matrix τ matter, of which the maximum
number is no more than min(|S|, 2|T |), bounded by the number of students |S|.
Let T ∗ be such a new type space induced from τ with |T ∗| ≤ min(|S|, 2|T |).
Then we can assign a student s with type vector τs one new type t
′
τs
∈ T ∗ and
no two students have overlapping types.
Now we proceed to the polynomial-time reduction from an instance of diver-
sity constraints ID = (S,C, qC , T, τ, η, η,X ,≻S ,≻C) to a corresponding instance
of regional quotas IR = (D,H,R, qH , δ, δ, Y,≻D,≻H ,≻R).
For each student sj ∈ S, create a corresponding doctor dj . Let D =
⋃
sj∈S
dj
denote the set of doctors. For each school ci ∈ C and each unique type vector τs
from type matrix τ , create a hospital hτsci with capacity qci . Let H
T ∗
ci
be the set of
hospitals induced from school ci. Denote the set of hospitals as H =
⋃
ci∈C
HT
∗
ci
with capacity vector qH = (qh)h∈H .
For each school ci ∈ C, create a set of regions of size (|T | + 1) denoted
by Rci = {ri, r
1
i , ..., r
|T |
i } where region ri corresponds to school ci and region
rji corresponds to type tj at school ci. Region ri contains all hospitals induced
from ci, i.e., Hri = H
T ∗
ci
and each region rji contains the hospitals induced from
school ci that are associated with type tj , i.e., Hrji
= {hτsi ∈ H
T ∗
i |τ
tj
s = 1}. The
maximum and minimum regional quotas for each region are described in Table 1.
Let R =
⋃
ci∈C
Rci denote the set of regions with δ = (δr)r∈R and δ = (δr)r∈R.
Table 1. Regions Rci induced from school ci
ri r
j
i
maximum quota δri = qci δrj
i
= η
tj
ci
minimum quota δri = 0 δrji
= ηtj
ci
related hospitals ri = H
T
∗
ci
r
j
i = {h
τs
ci
∈ HT
∗
ci
|τ
tj
s = 1}
For each contract x = (s, ci) ∈ X , create a new contract y = (d, hτsci ) with
doctor d corresponding to student s and hospital hτsci corresponding to type
vector τs of student s. Let Y =
⋃
x∈X {y} be the set of available contracts. Each
doctor d’s preference ordering ≻d corresponds to ≻s. For each hospital h ∈ HT
∗
ci
and each region r ∈ Rci , the preference orderings of ≻h and ≻r are consistent
with ≻ci over corresponding contracts involving hospital h and region r. The
preference profiles of doctors, hospitals and regions are denoted by ≻D,≻H ,≻R
respectively.
Proposition 3.1. The reduction takes time O(|C| · |S|2).
Proof. The running time of the construction depends on the number of all in-
duced elements. The number of doctors, hospitals and regions is O(|S| + |C| ·
|T ∗|+|C|·(|T |+1)). The number of capacities and type-specific quotas is bounded
by O(|H | + |R|). The number of contracts is at most |C| · |S|. The number of
preference orderings of doctors, hospitals and regions is O(|C| · |S|+ |C| · |T ∗| ·
|S|+ |C| · |S| · |T |) where |T ∗| ≤ |S| and |T | ≤ |S|. Thus the running time of the
reduction is O(|C| · |S|2).
Example 1. We illustrate the reduction with the following example. Consider an
instance ID with diversity constraints:
S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, C = {c}, qc = 2, T = {t1, t2}, τs1 = (0, 0),
τs2 = (0, 1), τs3 = (1, 0), τs4 = (1, 1), ηc = (1, 1), ηc = (1, 0),
X = {(s1, c), (s2, c), (s3, c), (s4, c)}, ∀s ∈ S (s, c) ≻s (s, ∅),
(s1, c) ≻c (s2, c) ≻c (s3, c) ≻c (s4, c) ≻c (∅, c).
Create a corresponding instance IR with regional quotas as follows, where re-
gion r corresponds to school c, region r1 corresponds to type t1 and region r2
corresponds to type t2 at school c.
D = {d1, d2, d3, d4}, H = {h00, h01, h10, h11}, ∀h ∈ H qh = 2,
R = {r, r1, r2}, r = H, r1 = {h10, h11}, r2 = {h01, h11},
δr = 2, δr1 = δr2 = 1, δr = δr2 = 0, δr1 = 1,
Y = {(d1, h00), (d2, h01), (d3, h10), (d4, h11)},
∀d ∈ D Yd ≻d (d, ∅), ∀h ∈ H Yh ≻h (∅, h),
(d1, h00) ≻r (d2, h01) ≻r (d3, h11) ≻r (d4, h11),
(d3, h10) ≻r1 (d4, h11), (d2, h01) ≻r2 (d4, h11).
The relationship between two instances is shown in Figure 2. The index of each
hospital is in binary corresponding to each distinct type vector. Note that four
copy schools {c00, c01, c10, c11} are used for interpretation only which are not
actually involved in the reduction.
c
c00 c10 c11 c01
t1 t2
r
h00 h10 h11 h01
r1 r2
Fig. 2. An example of reduction.
Next we show how the feasibility and stability of corresponding outcomes are
preserved under the reduction. Given an outcomeX of instance ID with diversity
constraints, create an outcome Y of induced instance IR with regional quotas
by adding a corresponding contract y to Y for each contract x ∈ X .
Proposition 3.2. The outcome X is feasible for ID with diversity constraints
if and only if the induced outcome Y under the reduction is feasible for IR with
regional quotas.
Proof. If outcome X is feasible for ID with diversity constraints, then for each
school c ∈ C, we have |Sc(X)| ≤ qc and ηc ≤
∑
s∈Sc(X)
τs ≤ ηc. Since each
school ci corresponds to a region ri, then no more than qci doctors are matched
to region ri in outcome Y , which implies that each hospital h
τs
ci
∈ ri admits no
more than qci doctors. Since each type j at school ci corresponds to a region r
j
i ,
then we have δ
r
j
i
≤ |D
r
j
i
(Y )| ≤ δ
r
j
i
, i.e., the outcome Y respects the regional
quotas of each region rji .
If outcome Y is feasible for IR with regional quotas, then for each region
r we have δr ≤ |Dr(Y )| ≤ δr. Since each region ri corresponds to a school ci,
then no more qci students are matched to ci in outcome X . Since each region r
j
i
corresponds to one type j at school ci, then all type-specific quotas of school ci
are satisfied in outcome X .
Proposition 3.3. The outcome X is stable for instance ID with diversity con-
straints if and only if the induced outcome Y under the reduction is stable with
regional priorities for instance IR with regional quotas.
Proof. If outcome X is stable, for the sake of contradiction, suppose outcome
Y admits a blocking pair (d, h) with regional priorities induced from student
s and school c respectively. Let D′ ⊆ Dh(Y ) be the set of doctors such that
each d′ ∈ D′ has lower priority than d at hospital h as well as at each region r
with h ∈ r, and hospital h can admit doctor d by removing doctors D′. Let the
set of students S′ correspond to doctors D′. Then student s and school c could
form a blocking pair, since school c could admit student s by removing S′, a
contradiction.
If outcome Y is stable with regional priorities, suppose outcome X admits a
blocking pair (s, c) and let S′ be the set of students such that each s′ ∈ S′ has
lower priority than s at school c and school c could admit student s by removing
S′. Let doctor d, region r and a set of doctors D′ correspond to student s, school
c and set S′ of students respectively. Then doctor d and hospital h could form
a blocking pair with regional priorities through a set of doctors D′, since all
induced hospitals Hc and regions Rc from school c have the consistent priority
orderings as school c, a contradiction.
4 Transformation from regional minimum quotas to
regional maximum quotas
In this section, we further show how to transform an instance of regional maxi-
mum and minimum quotas into a corresponding instance of regional maximum
quotas only in terms of feasibility.
Goto et al. [2014, 2016] considered how to represent regional minimum quo-
tas with regional maximum quotas in a restrictive setting where any doctor is
acceptable to any hospital and vice versa. In addition, the total capacity of all
hospitals is at least the number of doctors and no doctors are unmatched in
any feasible outcome. Their idea works as follows: If region r requires at least
δr doctors, then the number of doctors that can be assigned to other hospitals
which do not belong to region r cannot exceed |D| − δr. However, this does not
hold in general if we relax these requirements.
Example 2. There are two doctors d1, d2, two hospitals h1, h2 and two regions
r1 = {h1}, r2 = {h2} with δr1 = δr2 = δr1 = δr2 = 1. Following the reduction of
[Goto et al., 2014, 2016], after removing regional minimum quotas, the regional
quotas for the induced instance become δr1 = δr2 = 1. Then an empty outcome
is feasible for the induced instance but not for the original one.
Next we generalize their idea to general setting without any assumption by
adding an additional null hospital. Since we consider feasibility only, the prefer-
ence and priority orderings of doctors, hospitals and regions are not necessary.
Given a simplified instance of hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas
IR = (D,H,R, qH , δ, δ,Y), construct an instance with regional maximum quo-
tas only IR+ = (D′, H ′, R′, qH′ , δ′,Y ′) as follows:
The set of doctors remains the same and a null hospital h0 is added to H ,
i.e., D′ = D and H ′ = H ∪ {h0}. Let qH′ = (qh)h∈H′ with qh0 = |D
′|. For each
region r ∈ R, create a new region rˆ = H ′ \ {r} with δrˆ = |D′| − δr. The set of
all regions is denoted as R′ =
⋃
r∈R{r, rˆ}. For each doctor d ∈ D
′, add a new
contract (d, h0) to Y, i.e., Y ′ =
⋃
d∈D′{(d, h0)} ∪ Y.
Proposition 4.1. The reduction takes time O(|R|+ |D| · |H |).
Proof. The time of copying instance IR is bounded byO(|D|+|H |+|R|+|D|·|H |).
In addition, we create one new hospital h0 and a set of new regions and contracts,
whose total number is bounded by O(|R|+ |D| · |H ′|) where |H ′| = |H |+1. Thus
the construction of instance IR+ takes time O(|R|+ |D| · |H |).
Proposition 4.2. An outcome Y is feasible for instance IR with both regional
minimum and maximum quotas if and only if the outcome Y is feasible for the
induced instance IR
+
with regional maximum quotas only.
Proof. If outcome Y respects regional quotas for IR, then for each r ∈ R, the
number of doctors matched to H \ {r} does not exceed δrˆ = |D′| − δr, which
implies the region rˆ respects regional quotas. If Y respects regional quotas for
IR
+
, then for each rˆ ∈ R′, the number of doctors matched to rˆ does not exceed
δrˆ = |D
′| − δr, which implies at least δr doctors are matched with region r.
Our reduction reveals an important distinction between regional minimum
quotas and regional maximum quotas: In an instance with regional maximum
quotas only, any number of doctors can be placed at the null hospital without
violating feasibility. But when we translate regional minimum quotas into re-
gional maximum quotas, we limit the maximum number of doctors that can be
matched to the null hospital by imposing regional caps to some regions that
contain the null hospital.
5 Complexity results
This section is devoted to the complexity results on checking the existence of a
feasible and stable outcome for both settings. We first prove NP-completeness for
setting (1), then by reduction from setting (1) to setting (2), it implies that these
NP-completeness results also hold for setting (2). In view of this, we help unify
some complexity results that were already proved in previous literature, and
we further show these NP-completeness results still hold under more restrictive
settings.
Complexity of computing a feasible outcome
Next we provide a polynomial-time reduction from (3,3)-Set cover problem
to school choice problem with diversity constraints. Gonzalez [1985] has proved
that (3,3)-Set cover is NP-complete.
(3,3)-Set cover
Input: A collection F of subsets of a finite set U and a positive
integer k where each u ∈ U occurs in at most three subsets
of F and each f ∈ F contains at most three elements of U .
Question: Is there a subset F ′ ⊆ F of size at most k such that⋃
f∈F ′ f = U?
Proposition 5.1. It is NP-complete to check the existence of a feasible outcome
for school choice problem with diversity constraints, even if there is only one
school, each student belongs to at most three types, each type contains at most
three students and there is no upper bound for any type.
Proof. Given an instance ID with diversity constraints, to decide whether ID
admits a feasible outcome or not is in NP, since we can guess an outcome X and
check whether X satisfies feasibility in polynomial-time.
Given an instance (F,U) of (3,3)-Set Cover, create a corresponding instance
ID with diversity constraints as follows: For each element ui ∈ U , create a type
ti. For each subset fj ∈ F , create a student sj . A student sj belongs to type ti
if ui ∈ fj. Create one school c with capacity qc = k and minimum quota ηt = 1
for each type t ∈ T . For each student s ∈ S, create a contract (s, c) which is
acceptable to both s and c. Create an arbitrary priority ordering ≻c.
If (F,U) admits a Yes-instance F ′ of size at most k, then let S′ =
⋃
fj∈F ′
sj denote the corresponding set of students. The outcome X =
⋃
sj∈S′
(sj , c)
is feasible for ID with diversity constraints, since school c admits at most k
students and each minimum type-specific quota is satisfied.
If ID with diversity constraints admits a feasible outcome X , let F ′ =⋃
sj∈Sc(X)
fj denote the corresponding subsets of F . Then we have a Yes-instance
of (3,3)-Set Cover, since we have |F ′| ≤ k and
⋃
f∈F ′ f = U .
Although Goto et al. [2014] proved it is NP-complete to check the existence of
feasible outcomes for setting (2), their original reduction requires both regional
minimum quotas and regional maximum quotas (which needs to be equal for each
region). Under the assumption that no doctor is unmatched in any feasible out-
come (as discussed in last section), they infer that “checking whether a feasible
matching exists or not is NP-complete where there are only regional minimum
quotas or only regional maximum quotas”. However, if we relax the assump-
tion, it can be done in polynomial-time to check whether a feasible matching
exists when there are only regional maximum quotas, since an empty matching
satisfies feasibility. With the help of our reduction, we further show this NP-
completeness result even holds for a more restrictive setting when there are only
minimum quotas in the following corollary:
Corollary 5.1. It is NP-complete to check the existence of a feasible outcome
for hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas, even if each doctor is matched
to at most three regions, each region admits at most three doctors and contains
at most three hospitals, except for one region that contains all hospitals and is
matched with all doctors.
In another recent work on public housing allocation with diversity con-
straints, Benabbou et al. [2018] showed that it is NP-complete to check whether
there exists a feasible assignment with maximum social welfare, which is different
from ours.
Complexity of computing a stable outcome
Now we move on to the complexity question of deciding the existence of a stable
outcome. In previous work, Huang [2010] showed that it is NP-hard to compute a
stable matching for school choice with diversity constraints when both minimum
and maximum quotas exist. Next we show that if there are no minimum quotas, it
is NP-complete to check whether a stable outcome exists under strict preferences.
The following reduction is inspired by the work on hospital-doctor matching with
couples by Ronn [1990] and McDermid and Manlove [2010].
Proposition 5.2. Given an instance of school choice with diversity constraints
in which there are no minimum quotas, it is NP-complete to decide whether there
exists a stable outcome under strict preferences, even if there are only two types,
the capacity and type-specific maximum quotas for each school are at most 2 and
the length of any preference / priority ordering is at most 4. 6
Proof. First we prove that if there are no minimum quotas, deciding whether a
stable outcome exists is in NP. We can guess an outcome X and check whether
X admits a blocking pair in polynomial time as follows: For each student s and
each school c such that (s, c) ≻s Xs, if school c can admit student s by removing
all students who are matched to school c with lower priority than student s, then
outcome X is not stable. This is because removing a set of students with lower
priority than student s does not violate feasibility requirement.
Next we show it is NP-hard by reduction from a restricted version of 3-SAT
where each literal appears exactly twice, which is NP-complete [Berman et al.,
2003]. Given an instance (U,W ) of 3-SAT in which each literal appears exactly
twice, let U = {u1, . . . , uk} denote a set of variables and W = {w1, . . . , wl} be a
set of clauses. Create an instance ID with diversity constraints as follows.
For each variable ui ∈ U , create a gadget consisting of 22 students and 18
schools as shown in Table 2 and 3. Students ti1 and t
i
2 stand for the first and
second occurrence of literal ui. Students f
i
1 and f
i
2 stand for the first and second
occurrence of literal u¯i.
For each clause wj ∈ W , create exactly one school oj with capacity 2 and
maximum quota 2 for two types. Let s(l1) ≻oj s(l2) ≻oj s(l3) denote the priority
ordering of school oj where s(lk) denotes the corresponding student of literal lk
that appears in clause wj .
Note that o(ti1) and o(t
i
2) in the preference of student t
i
1 and t
i
2 stand for
two schools induced by the clauses in which ui appears for the first and second
time. Similarly, o(f i1), o(f
i
2) correspond to two schools induced from the clauses
in which u¯i appears for the first and second time. In the priority ordering of
school βik,3, θ stands for t
i
k when k ∈ [1, 2] and stands for f
i
k−2 when k ∈ [3, 4].
6 In the previous version, we implicitly assume that there are no minimum quotas.
student type vector preference
si1 (1, 1) c
i
1 c
i
t1
si2 (1, 1) c
i
2 c
i
f1
si3 (1, 0) c
i
1 c
i
2
si4 (0, 1) c
i
2 c
i
1
si5 (0, 0) c
i
1 c
i
t2
si6 (0, 0) c
i
2 c
i
f2
ti1 (1, 0) c
i
t1
o(ti1) β
i
1,3
ti2 (0, 1) c
i
t2
o(ti2) β
i
2,3
f i1 (1, 0) c
i
f1
o(f i1) β
i
3,3
f i2 (0, 1) c
i
f2
o(f i2) β
i
4,3
αik,1 (0, 1) β
i
k,2 β
i
k,1
αik,2 (1, 0) β
i
k,1 β
i
k,2
αik,3 (1, 1) β
i
k,3 β
i
k,1
Table 2. Students induced from variable ui
where k ∈ [1, 4]
school capacity maximum quotas priority ordering
ci1 2 (1, 1) s
i
4 s
i
1 s
i
3 s
i
5
ci2 2 (1, 1) s
i
3 s
i
2 s
i
4 s
i
6
cit1 1 (1, 1) s
i
1 t
i
1
cit2 1 (1, 1) s
i
5 t
i
2
cif1 1 (1, 1) s
i
2 f
i
1
cif2 1 (1, 1) s
i
6 f
i
2
βik,1 2 (1, 1) α
i
k,1 α
i
k,3 α
i
k,2
βik,2 1 (1, 1) α
i
k,2 α
i
k,1
βik,3 1 (1, 1) θ α
i
k,3
Table 3. Schools induced from variable ui
Lemma 5.1. If there exists a satisfying assignment α : U → {false, true} of
instance (U,W ) of 3-SAT, then the induced instance ID of school choice admits
a stable outcome.
Proof. For each gadget induced from variable ui, if the value of ui is true in the
assignment α, then select the outcome X iT :
X iT = {(s
i
1, c
i
1), (s
i
2, c
i
f1
), (si3, c
i
2), (s
i
4, c
i
2), (s
i
5, c
i
1),
(si6, c
i
f2
), (ti1, c
i
t1
), (ti2, c
i
t2
), (f i1, o(f
i
1)), (f
i
2, o(f
i
2)),
(αik,1, β
i
k,2), (α
i
k,2, β
i
k,1), (α
i
k,3, β
i
k,3)};
otherwise select outcome X iF :
X iF = {(s
i
1, c
i
t1
), (si2, c
i
2), (s
i
3, c
i
1), (s
i
4, c
i
1), (s
i
5, c
i
t2
),
(si6, c
i
2), (t
i
1, o(t
i
1)), (t
i
2, o(t
i
2)), (f
i
1, c
i
f1
), (f i2, c
i
f2
)
(αik,1, β
i
k,2), (α
i
k,2, β
i
k,1), (α
i
k,3, β
i
k,3)}.
For the school oj induced from clause wj = (l1, l2, l3), if the value of literal lk is
false in the assignment α, then match the student s(lk) corresponding to literal
lk to school o
j .
Next we show that none of induced schools would be part of any blocking
pair. First consider any school oj induced from clause wj . Since the assignment
α is satisfying, no more than two students will be matched to oj , otherwise
corresponding clause is false. School oj would not be part of any blocking pair,
since it can admit any two students without violating feasibility. Then con-
sider the schools in the gadget induced by variable ui. If we select outcome
X iT , then s
i
1, s
i
4, s
i
5, t
i
1, t
i
2, c
i
2, c
i
f1
, cif2 , α
i
k,1, α
i
k,2, α
i
k,3 are matched with their top
choices, which implies they cannot be part of any blocking pair. Then we can
infer ci1 cannot form a blocking pair with s
i
4, c
i
t1
cannot form a blocking pair
with si1 and c
i
t2
cannot form a blocking pair with si5. If we select outcome
X iF , then s
i
2, s
i
3, s
i
6, f
i
1, f
i
2, c
i
1, c
i
t1
, cit2 , α
i
k,1, α
i
k,2, α
i
k,3 are matched with their top
choices. Then we can infer ci2 cannot form a blocking pair with s
i
3, c
i
f1
cannot
form a blocking pair with si2 and c
i
f2
cannot form a blocking pair with si6. Thus
any induced school would not be part of any blocking pair.
Lemma 5.2. In any stable outcome X for ID, if (ti1, c
i
t1
) ∈ X, then (ti2, c
i
t2
)
∈ X; if (f i1, c
i
f1
) ∈ X, then (f i2, c
i
f2
) ∈ X.
Proof. If (ti1, c
i
t1
) ∈ X , then we have (si1, c
i
1) ∈ X , otherwise student s
i
1 and
school cit1 will form a blocking pair. Then we can infer (s
i
5, c
i
1) ∈ X , otherwise
student si5 and school c
i
t1
will form a blocking pair. Thus (ti2, c
i
t2
) ∈ X holds,
otherwise they will form a blocking pair. Similarly, if (f i1, c
i
f1
) ∈ X , then we have
(si2, c
i
2) ∈ X , otherwise student s2 and school c
i
f1
will form a blocking pair. Then
we can infer (si6, c
i
2) ∈ X and (f
i
2, c
i
f2
) ∈ X holds, otherwise they will form a
blocking pair.
Lemma 5.3. For any stable outcome X for induced instance ID, students ti1,
ti2, f
i
1, f
i
2 must be matched with their first two choices.
Proof. Given any stable outcome X , student ti1 cannot be unmatched, otherwise
ti1 will form a blocking pair with school β
i
k,3. Suppose student t
i
1 is matched
to βik,3. Then there will be two cases: either i) student α
i
k,3 is matched to β
i
k,1
or ii) αik,3 is unmatched. For case i), we have student α
i
k,1 is matched to β
i
k,2,
otherwise αik,1 and β
i
k,1 will form a blocking pair. However, α
i
k,2 and β
i
k,2 will
form a blocking pair, leading to a contradiction. For case ii), if both students
αik,1 and α
i
k,2 are matched to β
i
k,1, then α
i
k,1 and β
i
k,2 will form a blocking pair.
If αik,1 is matched to β
i
k,2, α
i
k,3 and β
i
k,1 will form a blocking pair. Thus for any
stable outcome X , student ti1 cannot be matched to β
i
k,3, and student t
i
1 must
be matched to his first two choices. The similar arguments work for students ti2,
f i1, f
i
2.
Lemma 5.4. For any stable outcome X for induced instance ID, either (ti1, c
i
t1
) ∈
X, (f i1, c
i
f1
) /∈ X holds or (ti1, c
i
t1
) /∈ X, (f i1, c
i
f1
) ∈ X holds.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose (ti1, c
i
t1
) /∈ X and (f i1, c
i
f1
) /∈ X
first. Then we have (si1, c
i
t1
) ∈ X and (si2, c
i
f1
) ∈ X , otherwise students ti1 and f
i
1
will form blocking pairs with schools cit1 and c
i
f1
respectively. Then we can infer
that (si3, c
i
2) ∈ X , (s
i
4, c
i
1) ∈ X , otherwise students s
i
1 and s
i
2 will form blocking
pairs with ci1 and c
i
f1
respectively. However, X is not stable, since si3 and s
i
4 can
form blocking pairs with ci1 and c
i
2 respectively.
Then suppose (ti1, c
i
t1
) ∈ X and (f i1, c
i
f1
) ∈ X . Then we have (si1, c
i
1) ∈ X
and (si2, c
i
2) ∈ X , otherwise s
i
1 and s
i
2 will form blocking pairs with c
i
t1
and cif1
respectively. However, outcome X is not stable, since students si4 and s
i
3 can
form blocking pairs with schools ci1 and c
i
2 respectively.
Lemma 5.5. If there is a stable outcome X for ID, then there is a satisfying
assignment α for the 3-SAT instance (U,W ).
Proof. For each variable ui, if (t
i
1, c
i
t1
) ∈ X , then set ui to be true; if (f i1, c
i
f1
) ∈ X ,
then set ui to be false. By Lemmas 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, this assignment is consistent.
Suppose there is a clause wj with all literals set to false. Then the corresponding
school oj must accommodate three students, exceeding the capacity of oj , a
contradiction.
This concludes the proof of the Proposition 5.2.
Corollary 5.2. It is NP-complete to check whether there exists a stable outcome
with regional priorities for hospital-doctor matching without regional minimum
quotas, even if each region contains at most 4 hospitals, the capacity of each
hospital and the maximum quota of each region is at most 2, and the length of
any preference / priority ordering is at most 4.
6 Algorithm design for Weaker Stability
In this section we discuss the second implication of the reduction: how positive
results for setting (2) hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas could lead
to corresponding results for setting (1) school choice with diversity constraints.
In general, stability with regional preferences is too strong to guarantee the
existence of stable outcomes and it is NP-complete to decide whether one exists
even if there are only regional maximum quotas.
Suppose there exists an algorithm φ that takes an instance IR with regional
quotas as input and returns a feasible and weaker stable outcome with respect
to priorities of hospitals and regions. Given an instance ID with diversity con-
straints, we can first convert ID into a corresponding instance IR with regional
quotas in polynomial time. Then apply the algorithm φ designed for matching
with regional quotas to instance IR to obtain some feasible and weaker stable
outcome XR. By the corresponding relation, we can restore the outcome XR to
an outcome XD of instance ID that also satisfies feasibility and some form of
weaker stability.
Now the problem boils down to designing a weaker stable concept for setting
(2) which should be weak enough to guarantee the existence of feasible and
stable outcomes but still strong enough to lead to reasonable outcomes. One
possible way, which has been considered in the mechanism design of matching
markets Fragiadakis et al. [2016], Goto et al. [2016], Kurata et al. [2017], is to
decompose stability into fairness and non-wastefulness, and then weaken one or
both of them to obtain some weaker stable concept.
However, as far as we know, there is no convincing stability solution that
works for a general instance of matching with regional quotas. Previous work
mainly concentrates on special cases where regions form a partition or a hierarchy
of hospitals, and they additionally assume there exists a strict master list over
doctors that is used to determine which doctor should be matched when conflicts
occur Goto et al. [2014, 2015, 2016]. Note that a master list is equivalent to
imposing unified regional priorities on all regions. Based on such a strict master
list over doctors, we can easily design a strategy-proof algorithm that always
returns a feasible and stable outcome with regional priorities when there are only
regional maximum quotas. For example, we can just employ serial dictatorship,
which lets each doctor choose their favorite hospital without violating hospital
capacity and regional maximum quotas in the order of master list, to obtain a
stable outcome with regional priorities where regional priorities are consistent
with master list Goto et al. [2014], Fragiadakis et al. [2016].
The following fairness concept for school choice with diversity constraints is
a weaker version of fairness by considering master list. Compared to original
fairness definition, it additionally requires that student s could have justified
envy towards a non-empty set of students S′ by master list if each student
s′ ∈ S′ has lower master list priority than student s.
Definition 3 (Fairness by Master List). Given an instance ID with diversity
constraints, a feasible outcome X for ID and a strict master list ≻ML, a student
s has justified envy toward a non-empty set of students S′ ⊆ Sc(X) by master list,
if the following conditions hold: i) (s, c) ≻s (s,Xs), ii) for each s′ ∈ S′, we have
(s, c) ≻c (s′, c) and (s, c) ≻ML (s′, c) and iii) X∪{(s, c)}\(
⋃
s′∈S′{(s
′, c)}∪Xs})
is a feasible outcome for ID. A feasible outcome X is fair by master list if X
does not admit justified envy by master list.
Consider an instance ID of school choice without type-specific minimum quotas
and a strict master list. If we apply serial dictatorship to its induced instance
IR with regional quotas, then we obtain a feasible and stable outcome XR with
regional priorities where each regional priority ordering is consistent with the
master list. When we restore the outcome XR to outcome XD of the original
instance ID, we have a feasible, non-wasteful and fairness outcome by master
list. This serves well for the illustration of how positive results for setting (2)
could lead to corresponding results for setting (1). Designing an appropriate
stability concept for matching with regional quotas requires more exploration.
One key conclusion of our results is that further developments on axiomatic and
algorithmic aspects of hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas will result
in corresponding results in school choice with diversity constraints.
7 Summary and Discussion
In this paper we provide a formal connection between two important forms
of distributional constraints via a polynomial-time reduction. Our reduction has
two implications: First, if we have NP-completeness results in the model of school
choice with diversity constraints, then these complexity results also carry over to
the model with regional quotas. Second, positive results, such as polynomial-time
algorithms that guarantee the existence of some weakly stable outcomes for the
model with regional quotas, imply corresponding results for school choice with
diversity constraints.
Note that our reduction can be generalized to new models appearing in recent
literature on school choice with diversity constraints. Matching with slot-specific
priorities was proposed in [Kominers and So¨nmez, 2016] where each slot (an
extension of type) could have different priority orderings. This requires that the
induced hospitalsHi and regions Ri should have different priority orderings from
school ci. To overcome non-existence of feasible outcomes and improve efficiency,
diversity constraints may be regarded as soft bounds and schools could admit
more students than the type-specific quotas allows if some seats are unoccupied
[Kojima, 2012, Hafalir et al., 2013, Ehlers et al., 2014, Kurata et al., 2017].
This implies that in the induced instance, each doctor could have contracts
with multiple hospitals at the same region. We can still convert an instance
with these complicated diversity constraints into a corresponding instance with
regional quotas, since the mapping relationship between two models does not
change. Further development on matching with regional quotas will shed light
on the problem of school choice with diversity constraints. Finally, it will be
interesting to explore similar connections with other matching models (see e.g.,
[Aziz et al., 2018, Jones and Teytelboym, 2016]).
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